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Abstract 
The issue of justice figures prominently m various stages of 
democratization yet the topic is still understudied in the broad literature 
of democratization. The handling of transitional justice is crucial to the 
successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. However, the 
type of transition (e.g., transformation vs. replacement) also significantly 
shapes the approach toward transitional justice: forgive and forget vs. 
prosecute and punish. More importantly, enhancing social justice is 
essential to the prospect of the upgrading from electoral democracy to 
liberal democracy. As discussions on Third World democratization move 
from quantity (democratic enlargement) to quality (democratic consolidation), 
an examination of the role played by justice is crucial. 
This article studies an index case of newly democratized country-
Taiwan. It first examines Taiwan's unique approach toward transitional 
justice, by focusing on the February 28 Incident, and discusses some of 
the rationales for the political calculus for this approach, including 
considerations for ethnic relations. It then provides a preliminary 
empirical exploration into the role justice plays in Taiwan's 
democratization by analyzing the data from "proxy'' questions for justice 
in TEDS- Taiwan's premier survey research consortium. Survey results 
show that Taiwanese electorate display high degree of commitment 
toward democracy, despite some ambivalence and they attach great 
importance to justice in the country's evolution into a liberal democracy. 
Key Words: transitional justice, democratic consolidation, electoral democracy, 
liberal democracy, February 28 Incident, TEDS 
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Introduction: The Role of Justice in Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation 
Justice has become an increasingly important issue for many newly 
democratized countries (NDCs)1 -- both as a scholarly inquiry and as a 
policy issue. It is a critical factor in a NDC's success in reconciling its 
ignoble past, establishing legitimacy among its yearning citizens, and 
enhancing the prospect of sustaining its young democracy. However, 
reaching generalizations on the relationship between justice and democracy 
across NDCs is elusive. Some scholars have cogently argued that the precise 
role that justice plays in each NDC depends on the context? 
Nevertheless, it is useful to make some general statements by 
distinguishing the various phases of democratization and by discussing how 
justice can play a part in each phase. First, the handling of justice is crucial to 
the success of the process of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. 
An emergent literature has dealt with the issue of "transitional justice" from 
theoretical and comparative perspectives. 3 How to deal with former regimes 
This paper defines NDCs as those countries in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe that underwent democratic transitions in the late 1980s-early 1990s. Although 
generally considered to belong in the cohort known as Third Wave democracies 
(Huntington 1991), the NDCs differed from the more established "new democracies'' 
like Spain and Portugal in that many of them did not ever have a history v.ith 
democracy and that they are more likely to score in the low-end of the ''free'' category 
of nations, as tracked by the Freedom House - that is, their combined averages of 
political rights and civil liberties are more likely to be around 2, whereas the averages 
for older Third Wave democracies are usually 1 or 1.5 (Freedom House classifies 
nations with a combined score from 1-2.5 as "free," 3-5.5 as "partly free," and 5.5-7 as 
"not free." See Freedom House (2005). 
For a cross-national comparison on the relationship between justice and democracy, 
see Bontekoe and Stepaniants (1997). 
For theoretical discussions of transitional justice. see Teitel (2000) and Kritz (1995). 
Roehrig (2002) compares how Argentina, Greece, and South Korea prosecuted their 
3 
with dubious human rights records is a dilemma facing most NDCs. On the 
one hand, the new democratic regime may want to seek retrospective justice 
(or even retributive justice) not only because the victims' closure demands it 
but also because the new regime's legitimacy rests upon a clear break from 
the past. On the other hand, authoritarian holdovers may retain such 
considerable power and institutional safeguard that if the fragile new regime 
decides to take on them, it may risk its own demise and setback in the 
country's democratization. The calculus is thus a delicate balance between 
moral gains and political cost. 
Harvard professor Samuel Huntington captures this dilemma as a 
tradeoff between two approaches -- "prosecute and punish" and "forgive and 
forget," and he argues that each strategy has its pros and cons (1991: 211-31). 
His admonition is that ''justice was a function of political power" (228) and 
that a plausible strategy really depends on the type of transition: 
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(I) If transformation or transplacement occurred, do not attempt to 
prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights violations. The 
political costs of such an effort will outweigh any moral gains. 
(2) If replacement occurred and you feel it is morally and politically 
desirable, prosecute the leaders of the authoritarian regime 
promptly . . . . . . while making clear that you will not prosecute 
middle- and lower-ranking officials. 
(3) Devise a means to achieve a full and dispassionate public 
accounting of how and why the crimes were committed 
(Huntington 1991: 231 ). 
Space prevents this paper from repeating what has been said about 
fonner military leaders. Rotberg and Thompson (2000) focuses on South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and discusses the utility and limitation of truth 
commissions as a common method used by NDCs with repressive or strife-ridden pasts. 
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transitional or retrospective justice except this brief synopsis. 
Justice during democratic transition is undoubtedly important for the 
immediate fates of these democratic debutants: It may critically determine 
whether a democratic transition can succeed; it may also decide whether a 
NDC may revert back to authoritarian rule and rather than bringing about 
reconciliation, it contributes to acrimony and division. There is no easy 
answer or one-size-fit-all panacea. 
However, justice also plays a crucial prospective role in the long-term 
ultimate fate of a NDC: It constitutes a crucial element in democratic 
consolidation. As Hoover Institution scholar Larry Diamond correctly points 
out, "The third wave of democratization has had much greater breadth than 
depth" (1997: xvii). Many new democracies have all the trappings of 
electoral democracy, such as multiple political parties regularly competing 
for power through (relatively) free and fair elections, but they are deficient in 
many important aspects that defme a liberal democracy, such as extensive 
protections for individual and group rights, inclusive pluralism in civil 
society as well as party politics, civilian control over the military, institutions 
to hold officeholders accountable, and thus a strong rule of law secured 
through an independent, impartial judiciary.4 To that list one might also add 
social justice, as it forms a psychological foundation of democracy and 
affects democracy's quality. 
Conventional wisdom on democratization in the latter half of the 
twentieth century usually defmes democracy in procedural terms. This view 
sees democracy mainly as an instrument for voters to select their leaders. 
Hence, scholars on Third Wave democratization focus on free and fair 
l For a treatise on the distinction between liberal democracy and electoral democracy, 
see Diamond (1996). 
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elections periodically held featuring alternatives candidates.5 
However, people in democracies - old or new - expect more from 
democracy beyond merely the procedural and institutional aspects. Often 
they attach expectations for social justice. In many well-established 
democracies and also in some NDCs, such institutional fixtures as free and 
fair elections have not alleviated many voters' disenchantment, partly 
because they feel that their social and economic rights have not appreciably 
advanced as a result of democracy. Yale University political scientist Ian 
Shapiro puts this succinctly: 
Many people blame social injustice on the lack of democracy and 
assume that democracy is an important weapon in replacing unjust 
social relations with just ones. Yet this popular expectation is at 
variance with much academic orthodoxy, which recognizes that 
achieving political democracy guarantees nothing about the 
attainment of social justice ( 1996: 579). 
Having said that, Shapiro also concedes that there exists a "mutual 
dependence" of these two ideals: "Although democracy is not sufficient for 
social justice, arguments about democracy and social justice are more deeply 
entwined with one another than the conventional opposition suggests" (1996: 
580). 
One can reasonably assume that a new democratic regime that 
endeavors to promote certain justice-related reforms, such as rectifying past 
human rights abuses, tackling corruption, strengthening the rule of law, 
5 For example, Huntington defines a twentieth century political system as "democratic~o 
the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through !aJ!· 
honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes an 111 
which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (1991: 7). 
6 
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protecting the weak and the disadvantaged, and improving the welfare of the 
populace at large, can expect to garner greater public support and increase 
the voters' commitment toward democracy. Justice is at the forefront of 
discourse on democracy in the twenty-first century, when attention should 
move beyond procedural democracy toward substantive democracy.6 
Democracy in many new democracies is superficial; it is by no means 
impregnable or irreversible. This explains why most NDCs score in the lower 
end, rather than the higher-end, on the Freedom House's "free" category in 
terms of their civil liberties and political rights. This also explains \Vhy 
Freedom House (2003) lists 121 nations as electoral democracies but only 
considers 89 of them as '"free." In other words, all liberal democracies are 
electoral democracies, but not vice versa. A number of these 
"semi-democracies" or "illiberal democracies" may eventually become liberal 
democracies, but this trend is not preordained and by no means universal. 
This article argues that whether a NDC can evolve into a liberal 
democracy depends importantly on whether it can satisfactorily handle the 
issues of transitional justice and prospective justice. It seeks to explore these 
arguments by examining the case of Taiwan- an "index" case ofThird Wave 
democracy. The main purposes of this article are to examine the way that 
Taiwan authorities handle the issue of justice and to offer an educated guess 
on the prospect of Taiwan's transformation from an electoral democracy to a 
liberal democracy. 
Admittedly, providing an operational defmition for justice is a 
challenging task, theoretically and empirically. We nevertheless seek to shed 
some light on theoretical discussions by examining empirical data from the 
Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), a leading research 
6 For an argument on substantive democracy, see David Held (1995). 
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consortium for survey research on Taiwanese politics. Specifically, by 
examining certain TEDS questions as "proxy indicators," we fmd evidence 
that justice is becoming an increasingly salient issue in Taiwanese politics 
and given the "routinization" of elections in the recent decade and a 
relatively high degree of voter commitment to the democratic system, Taiwan 
would have a reasonable prospect for becoming a liberal democracy in the 
years ahead. But before we elaborate on our arguments and evidence, a brief 
background on Taiwan's political evolution as it relates to justice is in order. 
Taiwan's Politics of Justice: Background and 
Characteristics 
In many ways Taiwan is a representative Third Wave NDC. Its 
democratic transition occurred relatively late (two decades after its economic 
takeoff), considering its level of economic development. Until 1986, Taiwan 
politics was dominated by the Kuomintang (KMT) -- a Leninist party 
founded by Sun Yat-sen on the mainland but moved to Taiwan in the wake of 
the Chinese civil war in 1949. After 1986, political liberalization in Taiwan 
unfolded at a dazzling pace. In 1986 the opposition party, Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), was founded. In 1987 the Emergency Decree, often 
dubbed "martial law," was lifted and restrictions on the formation of new 
political parties and on the registration of newspapers were removed. The 
same year the ban on travels to the mainland was abolished. In 1988 Lee 
Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo to become the first native Taiwanese 
president. From 1991 to 1992, all the members of the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan were elected by voters in Taiwan. In 1994 the governor 
of the Taiwan Province and the mayors of the two special municipalities 
8 
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under the Cabinet, Taipei and Kaohsiung, were directly elected by voters for 
the first time. In 1996 voters exercise their democratic rights to elect the 
president of the Republic of China (ROC) for the first time in Chinese history, 
and Lee won by a landslide. In 2000, DPP candidates Chen Shui-bian won 
the presidency, marking the first peaceful transfer of executive power. In 
2001, the long-ruling KMT also lost its legislative majority, completing the 
rotation of power. In 2004, DPP's Chen won a narrowreelection.7 
In a nutshell: Taiwan's democratization process appeared more orderly and 
compressed in comparison to most other Third Wave democracies. In 
Huntington's (1991) tripartite typology of democratization, Taiwan's 
democratization experience exemplifies "transfonnation," with the elites taking 
the lead to liberalize and democratize the system (Gold 1997: 163). In fact, the 
party that started liberalization (KMT) continued to rule for more than a decade. 
On the issue of transitional justice, Taiwan's experience was also unique. 
As the discussions below show, victims were given reparations but no single 
individual was prosecuted. Naiteh Wu attributes this approach to the mode of 
Taiwan's democratic transition (transformation, rather than replacement), 
considerations for ethnic relations, and the distant past of compressed 
repression (2005: 77). He calls Taiwan a phenomenon of "ten thousand 
victims without a single perpetrator" (Wu 2005: 91 ). 
The conventional starting point for discussions on the role justice played 
in Taiwan's democratization is the "February 28, 1947 Incident," which 
began as a routine seizure of illicit cigarettes, became an island-wide uprising, 
and ended in a harsh military crackdown. Kerr (1965), a first-hand account 
published in the mid-1960s of the events surrounding the "228 incident," 
For more details on Taiwan's democratization process, see Cheng (1989), Tien (1989), 
Chan and Clark (1992), Chu and Lin (1996), Chao and Myers (1998), and Rigger (1999). 
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estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 people were killed across the 
island over several months. Thereafter, this tragic event had long symbolized 
the tensions between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders and over the KMT's 
authoritarian rule, although different communities remembered the event 
differently. This article will not go into the details on the causes and effects 
of the tragedy, which have been amply dealt with elsewhere.8 We will only 
point out a few important aspects, as it pertains to our discussions of 
democracy and justice in Taiwan. 
For almost four decades, "228," as the incident is called, was a taboo in 
Taiwan's political lexicon. For some, 228 exemplified the White Terror under 
the KMT rule. For Taiwan nationalists, 228 was a rallying point for their 
aspirations for national identity and self-determination. The uprising was 
repressed but truth and reconciliation were also postponed. 
It was not until Taiwan's democratic transition was well under way that 
the government actively sought to address the issue. Still the government 
approached it carefully in light of the implications for ethnic relations and 
political cost. In 1990 the Executive Yuan - Taiwan's Cabinet- convened 
a task force made up of respected scholars to study "228." In 1992 the task 
force published its report on 228- a generally respected report. In 1995, on 
the 48th anniversary of 228, the first monument erected at a Taipei park 
(each city and county would build their own monuments). At the dedication 
ceremony, President Lee told his countrymen: "As head of state, bearing the 
8 Lai, Myers, and Wei (1991), which provides the larger political and social context that 
helps understand why the tragedy occurred, is usually considered the standard·bear~ 
account on the 228 Incident. For a more recent rendition, see Phillips .(20?3). of 
contrast, the most recent rendition, "Research Report of the Attnbuuon .tt:) 
Respo~si.bilities of the February 28 Incident" <==A :Jf:j:JHfli$JIIiJfJE* ~1 9, 
corrurusswned by the February 28 Memorial Foundation and published on Februar) 
2006, accused Former ROC President Chiang Kai-shek as the main culprit. Some 
important scholars criticized this report as less than objective treatment of history. 
10 
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burden of mistakes made by the government and expressing the most sincere 
apology, I believe that with your forgiving hearts, we are able to transform 
the sadness into harmony and peace" (Tyson 1995). This first official 
apology for the incident marked a milestone in Taiwan's struggle to come to 
grips with its past. 
Then the legislature soon passed "The Statute on the Dealing and 
Compensation of the February 28 Incident" c==/\$ftf:~lltLJ?dmfttf~fj~).9 
Article 1 cites the law's rationales as ''to handle the issues related to 
compensation of the February 28 Incident, to make [our] countrymen 
understand the truth of the incident so as to heal historical wounds and 
improve ethnic groups' integration." 
The law established a commission made up by scholars and experts, 
impartial social notables, and representatives from the government and the 
victims or their families- called February 28 Incident Memorial Foundation-
for the purposes of verifying victim's claims and handling proper 
compensation. It also requires that at least one-quarter of the membership of 
the Commission must be victims or their families and representatives. 10 
In many ways, the rmal version of the law reflected a protracted process 
and several aspects of the law were contested. 11 The law also decreed 
February 28 a national holiday called "Peace Memorial Day," and ''urged the 
president or other relevant leaders to make important speeches." The phrase 
''the government should apologize to all the citizens" was voted down. 
The law provided financial compensation for the victim or the victim's 
family: The upper limit was NT$6 million (US$181,818). Instead of calling the 
9 
This law was promulgated by the president on AprilS, 1995, and it went into effect on 
October 7, 1995. For a text of the law, see the website of the Februruy 28 Incident 
10 Memorial Foundation at http://www.228.org.tw/about228_source.php. 
11 The foundation's homepage is at http://www.228.org.tw/ .. 
For an account of this political process, see China Times (1995). 
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payout ''pei chang," a term implying guilt or legal liability, the law settled for 
"bu chang," which implied some responsibility but also humanitarian concern. 
Those that had received compensation (called "jioujt' or emergency cash 
assistance with an upper limit ofNT$60,000) in 1947- mostly civil servants 
and teachers, most of who mainlanders- were not qualified. 
The law ''urged" the president to commute or grant amnesty to those 
sentenced to death or serving life sentence. Victims or their families can 
apply to have their reputation restored. As of October 6, 2004, the 
Foundation has received 2,756 cases and has reviewed 2,710 of them, with 
46 cases pending. The Foundation approved 2,247 reviewed cases (83%), 
9,286 recipients for the compensation, and NT$7.16 billion (US$217 million) 
in the funds for compensation - a considerable amount of money. The 
Foundation publishes the names of the victims and establishes memorial 
scholarships for the benefit of the victims' direct descendants. 12 
The law mandated that the Foundation to be "independent and impartial 
in executing its duties, subject to no interference whatsoever." Any government 
agency or private organization that deliberately refuses to turn over the 
documents or files requested by the Foundation is a criminal offense. 
Upon first look, Taiwan's measures dealing with the February 28 
Incident exhibit many similarities with the experiences of other NDCs. The 
February 28 Foundation was entrusted with wide legal powers to investigate 
the truth. It also published fmdings and actively promoted awareness, such as 
its campaign to establish 228 or peace monuments in every county and city 
throughout Taiwan and annual activities organized around the 228 
anniversary. Hence, Taiwan reformers clearly regard truth and reparation as 
important in the process of healing and reconciliation. 
12 See http://www.228.org.tw/pay228 _statistics_ case.php. 
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Achieving justice is clearly also an important component in Taiwan's 
transitional justice approach. The victims and their families are exonerated or 
rehabilitated. The government provides funds to compensate for their 
sufferings. Admittedly some of the sufferings, such as deaths or 
disappearances, cannot be ever fmancially compensated. 
Unlike some NDCs, however, the Taiwanese approach decided not to 
touch the perpetrators, such as Gen. Peng Meng-chi, who was the head of the 
Taiwan Garrison Command acting on the order from President Chiang 
Kai-shek, who was busy fighting the Communists on the mainland at the 
time and made the fatal mistake of sending troops to quell what he 
considered a "rebellion." Political cost was obviously a key concern. All the 
above-mentioned transitional justice measures were adopted in the 
late-1980s-early 1990s when the KMT, of which Chiang was its chairman 
until his death in 197 5, was still the ruling party. This again characterizes the 
type of democratic transition (i.e., transformation) that Taiwan went through. 
To sum up, Taiwan ·s strategy consists of reparation and truth-telling, but 
not retribution or punishment. Whether this strategy will bring about true 
reconciliation remains to be seen. 
The impact of transitional justice on ethnic relations was a clear reason 
for Taiwan's cautious strategy. Ethnic relations (seen mainly through the 
prism of mainlander-Taiwanese relationship) have appreciably improved in 
Taiwan in recent decades. Education, inter-marriages, and social mobility 
have all contributed to this. However, as seen from polls, election studies, 
scholarly works, and politicians' campaign rhetoric, the ethnic issue remains 
a crucial undercurrent in Taiwanese politics and a key fault line in Taiwan's 
identity. 13 Whether this issue can be handled well holds important promise 
13 See Wachman (1994) and Wu (1992). 
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for Taiwan's democratic consolidation or prospect of becoming a true liberal 
democracy. 
After establishing the background for the issue of justice in Taiwan's 
democratization, we now move to a look at where democracy stands in 
Taiwan as seen by the voters. But before that, a few more words on justice in 
Taiwan's democratization are in order. 
Democratization in Taiwan: Reflection on the 
Form and Substance of Democracy 
Many scholars have found the political changes that happened in Taiwan 
and other Third World countries do not really fit the content of a liberal 
democracy. Rather, they typify electoral democracy, or procedural democracy 
(Diamond 1996, 1997). Chu, Shin, and Diamond (2000) fmd that despite the 
substantial support for democracy in South Korea and Taiwan, there is also 
considerable amount of equivocation: Not only support for democracy lags 
behind the levels found in other emerging and established democracies, but 
also the two publics exhibit a significant residue of authoritarian or 
undemocratic values, akin to the portrait of "Asian" or traditional values. 
In our view, one key reason why democracy has not fully flourished is 
that justice has yet to be fully and well implemented in these countries. For 
liberal democracies as seen in North America and West Europe, they first 
establish extensive protection of individual and group freedoms and rights and 
uphold justice; and then implement democracy (like universal suffrage). Thus 
human rights and political rights are fully esteemed in these countries. In other 
words, they are liberal before they are democratic. For countries in the Third 
World like Taiwan, democracy arrives before justice is well acclaimed. 
14 
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A substantial literature on the political transition ofThird World countries 
has been accumulated over the last two decades. Two areas are often 
highlighted. One is the program and the process of political transition in these 
changing countries, and the other is the possible trend of political development 
in these countries. In the case of Taiwan, most of the existing scholarship has 
been retrospective, rather than prospective: That is, many scholars have studied 
Taiwan's changing politics since the implementation of political reforms in the 
mid-1980s, 14 but few have dealt with the issue of whether the trend of 
Taiwan's political development will be moving toward Western-style liberal 
democracy or maintaining a specific style of Asian democracy. The biggest 
difficulty of this part is that Taiwan, other Third World countries as well, is still 
a changing society, making prediction unpredictable. 
Regarding Taiwan's political transition, scholars have generally given 
credit to Taiwan's political changes and democratization since the 
mid-1980s, despite some negative signs. 15 In terms of Taiwan's future 
political development, it is open to debate mainly due to how the issue of 
justice is handled. For liberal democracies in West Europe and North 
America, justice is equally esteemed with democracy under their 
constitutions. For Taiwan, justice has been an issue, inadequately dealt with 
in the eyes of many, during the island's political transition. This means that 
citizens in Taiwan may be satisfied with the progress of democracy, but 
they may not give same credit toward the evolution of human rights on the 
island. To become a liberal democracy, Taiwan must first catch up with 
international standards on human rights. 
14 See the references in footnote 7. 
15 Chu and Lin (1996), for instance. argue that Taiwan's social cleavages emerged but did 
not affect Taiwan's transition from authoritarianism to a consolidated democracy. 
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The issue of justice is imperative for Taiwan. Taiwan has established a 
robust electoral democracy. But why has it failed to elevate the issue of 
justice to the standard of a liberal democracy? This has to do with the 
different social and political background of the two major ethnic groups in 
Taiwan. The mainlanders followed the KMT government to Taiwan in 1949, 
and later, due to their predominated privileges, they became a dominant 
group on the island, politically and economically. The local Taiwanese came 
to the island much earlier than the mainlanders during the mid-Ch'ing 
Dynasty in the 18th century, but their political and economic rights were 
suppressed during the KMT authoritarian rule from 1945 to the mid-1980s. 
As time went on, the gap between the mainlanders and Taiwanese widened, 
especially since the 228 Incident. The mainlanders, for instance, had better 
opportunities to serve in the government, either because of their connections 
with the then ruling KMT government or because of their extra privileges on 
the civil servants examination subject to their long-term service in the 
military. Taiwanese, on the other hand, had to either go through competitive 
examination in order to serve in the government or go to private sectors 
trying to make a living. 
Since the implementation of political reforms in Taiwan, all 
Taiwanese, regardless of their ethnic background, have now enjoyed most 
political freedoms and rights, similar to those in Western countries. The 
current DPP government especially makes promotion of human rights one 
of its political priorities. However, does this political development help 
Taiwan become a liberal democracy and narrow the gap between 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders? 
Scholars on the study of democratic consolidation have found a specific 
interaction between democracy and ethnic groups in a multi-ethnicity countrY· 
16 
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Samuel Huntington (1995), for instance, argues that a basic scheme to win 
popular votes in a democratic electoral system is to mobilize ethnic groups, 
which may also elevate political conflicts among ethnic groups. This is the 
so-called democratic paradox. Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Martin Lipset 
also contend that democratization may convert ethnic insecurity and political 
mobilization into ethnic violence and even secessionism, if the issue of 
power imbalance and discrimination is not well managed. Therefore, they 
argue that ethnic conflicts, especially when getting involved with secessionist 
movements, are actually poisonous to democracy. 16 
Accordingly, scholars on the political development of Third World 
countries often advocate that a precondition is necessary for an 
authoritarian regime to move toward democracy. Philippe Schmitter 
(1994: 65) and Robert Dahl (1989: 207), for example, have argued that 
democracy should be preconditioned by an existing and legal political 
system, so that all political forces would follow a set of common rules for 
political participation and competition. Dankwart Rustow (1974), on the 
other hand, contends that national unity should be preconditioned for 
democracy, which means the priority of national unity should be over 
democracy. In the case of Taiwan, Alan Wachman argues that the issue of 
Taiwan's ethnopolitics and national identity actually appeared after the 
island's regime transformation from authoritarianism to democracy (1994: 
4-5, 261). Taiwan may have successfully gone through the process of 
democratization, but the ethnicity-related issues have not yet been 
satisfactorily resolved. 
The issue of justice thus figures prominently. Viewed from an optimistic 
perspective (e.g., the modernization theory), Taiwan would have the 
16 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990: 29). 
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possibility to become a liberal democracy, because the sustained 
democratization in Taiwan would help manage the issue of justice on the 
island. This means the problems of social injustice and power imbalance 
would eventually be solved under popularly acknowledged rules and norms. 
Conversely, some others argue that the issue of justice must be further 
elevated before Taiwan's democracy can be truly consolidated. This implies 
that Taiwan's democratic mechanisms and institutions are not yet fully 
established and thus ethnic conflicts could continue to surface, especially as a 
result of politicians' exploitation ofthe ethnic issue for electoral gains. 
In sum, justice is crucial to Taiwan's prospect of democratic 
consolidation, yet the elevation of justice also hinges upon democratic 
consolidation. This symbiotic relationship can fmd some empirical support, 
as seen in opinion polls. How do Taiwanese regard their democracy and the 
issue of justice? Our discussions below reveal some interesting fmdings. 
Voter Attitudes Toward Democracy and Justice: 
A Preliminary Observation 
To gain some insights about how Taiwanese citizens view democracy 
and justice, we glean through several questions in the 2002 Taiwan Election 
and Democratization Study (TEDS). 17 Any survey results are essentially 
17 The TEDS is an inter-campus consortium made up by the leading survey researchers in 
Taiwan with the goals of consolidating research, pooling resources, sharing research 
results, and accumulating knowledge. Funded by the National Science Council (NSC). 
the project's principal investigator is Prof. Chi Huang of the National Chung-chen~ 
University. The population for the 2001 TEDS survey was all eligible voters aged 
twenty and over with valid residency in Taiwan and ROC citizenship. The survey use 
a stratified, three-stage, systematic random sampling method. After samples wer~ 
drawn, face-to-face interviews andre-interviews were conducted from January to Apn 
2002.Altogether. 2,022 successful interviews were concluded. See TEDS (2002). 
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reflections on the public mood at a given moment. Nevertheless, we choose 
the 2002 TEDS, because fmdings from this inaugural integrated election- and 
democracy-related survey in Taiwan establish a "benchmark" for evaluating 
the issue of democracy and justice in Taiwan. Our future studies can build 
upon fmdings in this article. 
The 2002 TEDS survey consists of a very long list of questions on 
respondents' demography, political efficacy, party politics, evaluation of 
democracy, and so on. Typically it takes about one hour to complete one 
interview. The questions consist of those that have been used in other 
countries, such as the American and British election studies, for 
cross-country comparisons and those that have been tested in Taiwan before 
for longitudinal research. Reflecting the status of Taiwan's democracy and 
the hitherto focus of survey research in Taiwan, the survey has 
well-established questions on political efficacy, democratic values, and party 
politics. But it does not have many questions on justice; the concept has yet 
to be operationalized and tested. Scholars at the National Election Center 
concede that this may be the next step in survey research in Taiwan, as. 
Taiwan's democratic development progresses in the years ahead. 18 Because 
justice has never been operationally defmed or formally asked in surveys in 
Taiwan, we resort to selecting those questions that serve as rough "proxy': 
indicators. This approximation is far from satisfactory, but we have to settle 
for this methodological compromise, given that our main goal was to analyze 
existing poll data, rather than inventing our own. 
Lacking questions specifically dealing with justice and not being a part 
in the process of questionnaire design, we have to settle for those questions 
18 The first author's interview at the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 
Taipei, July 18, 2003. 
19 
that are relevant to our topic. Notwithstanding the problems with validity, we 
nevertheless fmd some interesting and sobering results. 
We begin with the well-established question of political efficacy based 
on the premise that voters are more likely to feel the system as 'just," if they 
have a higher sense of political efficacy. 
Table llists the questions related to political efficacy. 
Table 1: Political Efficacy 
Percentagesa 
Questions SA A D SD N 
1. People like me can't possibly influence 6.9 1713 
. 4.7 30.9 57.4 
government policies 
2. Government officials don't care about what 3.7 1718 1 l 'k h' k 6.6 36.4 53.3 peop e 1 e me t m . 
3. Some people say that politics and 
government are very complex and hard to 11.3 63.7 23.0 2.0 1811 
understand. 
4. I think I have the ability to participate in 8.4 1795 1. . 2.5 23.1 66.1 po lhCS. 
5. The decisions made by government officials 7.1 1637 1 1.3 24.6 67.0 are a ways correct. 
6. Some people say that government officials 0.9 1688 ft ' 24.2 54.6 20.3 o en waste taxpayers money. 
7. Some people say that most government 44 
ffi . l h 1.3 16.5 60.3 22.0 17 o ICta s are onest and not corrupt. 
8. Do you think that when the government 
decides important policies, its first priority 8.7 48.4 34.9 8.0 1714 
is to protect the interests of the peop le?b 
Source: TEDS (2002) 
Note: 
• Frequencies and percentages are for four opinionated categories: SA= strongly agree. A 
=agree, D =disagree, SD =strongly disagree. N =number of valid responses. "Missing 
data" response categories are excluded. 
b The response categories for this question are "often," "sometimes," "seldom," and 
"never." 
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Democracy propagates the ideal about popular sovereignty. As a 
practical matter, almost all countries with a democratic form of government 
are representative democracies. However, citizens must still feel that they 
have a say in the making of public decisions that affect them and that they 
can participate in politics if they choose to in order for them to be committed 
to democracy. The issue of political efficacy is thus fundamentally connected 
to justice and goes to the core of democratic theory and practice. 
Upon initial look, Taiwanese voters' sense of political efficacy appears 
high. For example, judging from the frrst two questions: a large majority of 
voters (64.3%) reject that they cannot influence government policies, and 57% 
believe that government officials care about what people like them think. 
However, the next two questions show a mixed picture: Three-quarters of 
the voters agree that ''politics and government are very complex and hard to 
understand" and only around one-quarter of the voters believe that they have the 
ability to participate in politics. Obviously, the electorate's perceived complexity 
of politics dampen their efficacy in actually participating in politics. It should be 
noted that Taiwanese participation in certain political activities (e.g., elections) is 
comparatively high, although they participate less in other legal activities (e.g., 
contacting officials or lobbying) as often found in Western democmcies. 
These results reflect the nascent state of democracy in Taiwan. Voters do 
demand a responsive government and have the confidence that their opinions 
would count. However, they still lack the confidence, desire, or skills, to 
understand how politics function and active political participation is rare. To 
use Gabriel Almond's term, Taiwan's political culture is closer to that of 
"subject culture" than '"participatory culture." Whereas the former 
unquestionably forms an important foundation of electoral democracy, the 
latter is arguably indispensable to liberal democracy. 
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The other four questions show that voters do hold their officials 
accountable and they resent graft and waste. Three-quarters of voters do not 
agree that "decisions by government officials are always correct." Almost 
four-fifths of them think that government officials often waste taxpayers' 
money. 82.3% disagree that most officials are honest and not corrupt. About 
57% do think that the government has the people's interests in mind when 
making important policies. 
One reason for Chen Shui-bian's victory in the 2000 presidential 
election was that he ran on a reformist plank: He promised to take on the 
Black Gold (organized crime and money politics), for which the KMT under 
Lee Teng-hui had been widely accused of. These findings help explain 
Chen's electoral success and corroborate our argument that justice is 
important to the quality of democracy. By contrast, in addition to the DPP's 
general mediocre governing performance, a series of corruption scandals 
exposed during the campaigns contributed to the party's electoral debacle in 
the 2005 local elections. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of certain questions in the 2002 
TEDS pertaining to reform and justice on three aspects: ethnic problems, 
social welfare, and environmental elections. 
Table 2 can be viewed as some sort of scorecard on justice of the Chen 
administration, as seen by the voters. On ethnic relationships, 27% of the 
respondents say that such relationships have improved under the Chen 
government, and 25.7% say that the situation has become worse, with almost 
half of the respondents (47.3%) saying the situation is about the same. 
On environmental protection, almost one-half (48.6%) credit Chen's 
government, whereas only 6% fault him. 
,., 
--
- ----- --------------
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Table 2: Reform: Toward Greater Justice 
Percentages3 
Questions :MB B S W MW N 
1. Comparing the current government led by 
President Chen to the KMT government be~ ld th thn' 3.5 23.5 47.3 20.2 5.5 1755 1ore, wou you say at e tc 
problems are 
2. Comparing the current government led by 
President Chen to the KMT government be~ ld th ·I 1~ 3.8 31.0 51.6 11.9 1.7 1726 10re, wou you say at socta we 1are 
problems are 
3. Comparing the current government Jed by 
Pber;sident Ch
1
den to the thKMT g?vernment
1 5
.7 42.9 45 .4 5.6 0.4 1777 10re, wou you say at envrronrnenta 
protection is 
Source: TEDS (2002) 
Note: 
' Response categories: MB == much better than before, B == better, S = about the same. W 
"' a little worse, MW = much worse. N = number of valid responses. "Missing data'' 
response categories are excluded. 
Table 3: The 2001 Election and Justice 
Percentages 
Did this election stabilize ethnic harmony St b'l' Ril Large Some 
ril thn. . d'd . h a 1 tze e up . fl . fl or e up e tc tensiOns, or 1 tt ave m uence m uence 
no influence? 21.0 28.6 15.3 30.9 
Did this election decrease money politics 0 In Large Some d . d . . ecrease crease . fl . fl an organtze cnme or mcrease money m uence m uence 
politics and organized crime, or did it 
have no influence? 57.6 8.3 23.0 38.9 
Source: TEDS (2002) 
Note: Percentages of all responses, including non-opinionated categories. 
On the question of social welfare- also a prominent issue on the DPP's 
2000 plank, 34.8% say it has improved, 13.6% say it has worsened, and 
51.6% says it is about the same. 
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These results raise several interesting questions. First, opinions on the 
issue of ethnic relationship appear polarized. This is even reflected in the 
perception of progress or regress on ethnic relationships. Table 4 is a cross 
tabulation of perception of ethnic relationship by voters' party identification. 
It shows that opinions on this issue are highly partisan. Whereas nearly 
one-half of DPP supporters think ethnic relations have improved under the 
Chen government, 55% of People First Party (PFP) supporters disagree, with 
KMT supporters falling in between. 
Table 4: Opinions on Ethnic Relationships by Voter Party ID 
Percentages (N = 1772) 
Much better 
Better 
About the same 
Worse 
Much worse 
KMT supporters 
1.1 
14.1 
45.1 
28.2 
11.6 
DPP supporters 
5.7 
33.6 
46.4 
13.0 
1.2 
PFP supporters 
1.2 
11.7 
32.3 
38.5 
16.3 
Source: TEDS (2002). 
Note: The question is "Comparing the current government Jed by President Chen to the 
KMT government before, would you say that ethnic problems are (response 
category) ."Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Table 5: Opinions on Social Welfare by Voter Party ID 
Percentages (N = 173S) 
KMT supporters DPP supporters PFP supporterL 
Much better 1.1 6.3 1.2 
Better 21.0 45.1 18.9 
About the same 62.2 41.9 57.0 
Worse 13.5 6.3 19.7 
Much worse 2.2 0.4 3.3 ~ 
Source: TEDS (2002). th 
Note: The question is "Comparing the current government Jed by President Chen to : 
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KMT government before, would you say that social welfare problems are (respons 
category) ."Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 5 looks at the opinions of different parties' supporters on social 
welfare under the Chen government. DPP supporters are more likely to credit 
Chen. However, PFP and KMT supporters' opinions on this question are not 
as jaundiced as on the issue of ethnic relationship. 
The second puzzle is how to interpret the large "middle" category -
about half of the valid responses select "about the same." 19 Do these 
numbers reflect the voters' true opinions? Do they indicate voters' "safe" or 
"easy" or "default" answers when asked a complex question? The TEDS 
researchers apparently view "about the same" as a midpoint category. 
Table 3 summarizes results of two questions that ask voters specifically 
whether they think the 200 1 legislative elections ameliorate or worsen the 
problems of ethnic tensions and money and violence in elections. A slightly 
larger percentage of voters (28.6% vs. 21.0%) think that the 2001 election 
helped rile up ethnic tensions. Within these two groups, 30.9% said that the 
election contributed to some influence on stabilizing I riling up ethnic 
tensions, and 15.3% said the influence was great. The voters' verdict on 
refonn was considerably better: 57.6% said the 2001 election helped 
decrease money politics and organized crime, whereas 8.3% said it helped 
increase "black" and "gold." Within these two groups, 23.0% thought the 
election's influence was great and 38.9% said moderate. 
As might be expected, Table 6 shows that DPP supporters are more 
likely to view favorably the election's impact on ethnic tensions and money 
and violence in elections. However, strong majorities of KMT supporters 
(62.5%) and PFP supporters (54.3%) also said that the election helped 
decrease the influence of money and violence in politics. 
19 The "missing data" types of answers, like "do not know," "no opinion," or "refuse to 
answer;' in TEDS 2002 generally amount to 15-20% of the sample size. 
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Table 6: Effect of the 2001 Election on Ethnic Tensions and Black Gold Politics 
KMT 
supporters 
Did this election stabilize ethnic S b.1. h ril thni . ta 1 ze 22.5 arrnony or e up e c tensions, 
or did it have no influence (N = Ril 
1660) e up 42.6 
Did this election decrease money 
politics and organized crime or Decrease 62.5 
increase money politics and 
organized crime, or did it have Increase 12.6 
no influence? (N = 1682) 
Source: TEDS (2002) 
Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Percentages 
DPP PFP 
supporters supporters 
34.9 18.5 
27.2 51.8 
87.8 54.3 
3.8 20.0 
Democratic values provide an essential cognitive and attitudinal foundation 
for democratic consolidation. \Vhether democracy can endure depends as much 
on the establishment of democratic institutions as on a deep reservoir of 
democratic values. Earlier surveys and TEDS have studied this issue. For our 
purpose, Table 7 summarizes the results from a few questions related to justice. 
Viewed from these imprecise proxy questions, Taiwan's voters appear to 
care about justice greatly. They overwhelmingly (93%) reject the proposition 
that women should not participate in politics. Over two-thirds of them 
(67.3%) do not think that when judges rule on important cases, they should 
accept the opinions of executive organs. 81.7% of the voters say that 
corruption is widespread among Taiwanese politicians; this is surely a 
warning sign. And although Taiwanese citizens generally (73.2%) feel that 
their freedoms and human rights are respected, only 8.9% feel there is "a lot 
of' respect for individual rights and human rights. This shows that Taiwanese 
have taken for granted that democracy should promote justice and theY 
firmly expect to see progress being made in this regard. 
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Table 7: Selected Questions Related to Democratic Values 
Percentages3 
Questions SA A D SD N 
1. Women shouldn't participate in political 
. . . l'k d 1.0 6.0 66.8 26.1 1885 
activities 1 e men o. 
2. When judges rule on important cases, they 
should accept the opinions of executive 2.1 30.6 54.5 12.8 1636 
organs. 
3. How much respect is there for individual 
freedom and human rights nowadays in 8.9 73.2 16.5 1.4 1738 
Taiwan?b 
4. How widespread do you think corruption, 
such as bribe taking, is among politicians in 26.9 54.8 17.6 0.7 1643 
Taiwan?c 
5. Overall, do you feel satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the practice of democracy in Taiwan? d 3·7 65 .4 26·8 4·2 1726 
6. Do you agree with the following statement? 
"Democracy may have problems, but it is 13.3 73.2 12.9 0.6 1703 
still the best system." 
Source: TEDS (2002) 
Note: 
• Frequencies and percentages are for four opinionated categories: SA= strongly agree, A 
=agree, D =disagree, SD =strongly disagree. N =number of valid responses. "Missing 
data" response categories are excluded. 
b The response categories for this question are "a lot of' "some," "not much," and '"none 
whatsoever." 
' The response categories for this question are "very widespread" "quite v.idespread," 
"not very widespread," and "it hardly happens at all." 
d The response categories for this question are "very satisfied" "satisfied," "dissatisfied," 
and "not satisfied at all." 
27 
An ultimate test of the survivability of a new democracy is the degree of 
voters' commitment toward this form of government and way of life - as an 
abstract principle, rather than a contingent choice. Here we see encouraging 
signs, with some qualifications. Those that are satisfied with Taiwan's 
democracy outnumber those that are dissatisfied by a margin of larger than 
two-to-one (69.1% vs. 31%); but only 3.7% of all voters are "very satisfied" 
with how democracy has been practiced in Taiwan. This shows that there is 
considerable upside potential for improving Taiwan's democracy. Lastly, 
86.5% of the voters agree with the statement "Democracy may have problems, 
but it is still the best system." This shows that the Taiwanese are deeply 
committed to democracy, despite its problems. They will not favor a return to 
the authoritarian past. However, as argued earlier, they clearly also wants their 
new democratic polity to become even more democratic and just. In fac~ they 
are so deeply ingrained in electoral democracy that they regard elections as an 
instrument for further democratization.20 Unlike many countries fearful of the 
unpredictable results of free and fair elections (hence, instability), Taiwanese 
voters think that elections help promote stability and deepen democracy. In the 
2002 TEDS, 51.1% of respondents said that the 2001 legislative elections 
brought about progress in Taiwan's democracy, 12.0% said regress, and 18.4% 
said "no effect." On the question of whether the election helped promote or 
destroy political stability, 41% said "promote," 19.3% said "destroy," and 
21.2% said "no effect." Taiwanese voters clearly are used to elections and 
expect elections to help strengthen the country's democracy. This prevailing 
attitude of Taiwanese electorate - democracy is not perfect but it is still better 
2° For a treatise on elections as an instrument for democracy, see Powell (2000). Rigger 
(1999) argues elections in Taiwan, initially only at the local levels but eventu~lly 
expanded to offices at all levels, helped the Taiwanese to acquire the habit of votmg 
and to expect the regular holding of elections- election itself generating a momentum 
for democratization. 
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than other forms of government - is remarkably congruent with the 
psychological and behavioral prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. 
Conclusion: A Cautiously Optimistic Prognosis? 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan conceptualize "democratic consolidation" 
as having behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions and define a 
"consolidated democracy" as a "political regime in which democracy as a 
complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and 
disincentives has become, in a phrase, 'the only game in town'" (1997: 15). 
They elaborate on how democracy can become "the only game in town" on 
each of these three dimensions: 
Behaviorally, a democratic regime ...... is considered consolidated 
when no significant...... actors spend significant resources 
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic 
regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic 
regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even 
in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction 
with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and 
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life ..... . 
Constitutional!)~ a democratic regime is consolidated when 
governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, 
as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds 
of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions that are sanctioned 
by the new democratic process (Linz and Stepan 1997: 16). 
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Judging from Taiwan electorate's commitment to democracy, despite its 
problems, and their habitual experience with, and expectation of, elections, 
the conditions appear relatively favorable for democratic consolidation. 
Przeworski et al's statistical analysis (1997) identifies five main factors that 
make democracy ensure: (1) democracy, (2) affluence, (3) economic growth and 
moderate inflation, reduced inequality, (4) international climate, and (5) 
parliamentary institutions. Although none of these conditions is sufficient for 
democracy to endure, several of these factors do work in Taiwan's favor. 
As we have discussed, Taiwanese show high approval of democracy. This 
may be a function of the nascence of their democracy - a result of the initial 
euphoria. Results from the 2001 legislative elections, as seen in TEDS 2002, 
may reflect some extent of the "honeymoon" effect of the first peaceful 
transfer of power in the nation's history. Indeed, as Taiwan's economy 
continues to be in doldrums, voters increasingly say that DPP government's 
incompetence also contributes to the problem, as does international economic 
downturns and obstruction by opposition parties. Whether their dissatisfaction 
with the state of the economy translates into punishment of the incumbent 
(retrospective voting)- thus confirming "democracy is at work," or a general 
malaise or even disenchantment with democracy remains to be seen. 
However, it is clear from poll results that Taiwanese voters have a view 
on what democracy can or cannot deliver that is more realistic than their 
counterparts in other NDCs. People in many NDCs with a long history of 
authoritarian rule and economic stagnation have pent-up demand on their 
new democracy- a natural reaction driven by a sense of justice. They expect 
democracy to bring in material well-being, healthy party politics, social 
stability or anything else denied to them during their countries' authoritarian 
pasts. But the new democracy does not operate in a political vacuum and 
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when it is hamstrung by many countervailing forces and fails to meet voters' 
expectations, many people or groups risk abandoning their new rules of the 
game and way of life. Democracy thus faces real dangers for survival. 
Taiwan's democratic transition occurred after the country had achieved 
relatively high degree of economic development and social equity - in other 
words, under favorable conditions. Unlike in the past, the democratic 
regime's legitimacy does not depend on economic performance. The 
democratic institutions are viewed as legitimate. 
However, the process of Taiwan's democratization is not problem-free, 
especially concerning the issue of justice. Although it is laudable that Taiwan 
dealt with its transitional justice problem by honestly facing its past and 
establishing a commission for the purposes of compensating the victims, it 
has not done anything to the perpetrators. And there are good political 
reasons for not doing it. It has also not used truth-telling, no matter how 
painful it is, for democratic education purposes (the "never again" argument) 
(Wu 2005). The wisdom to reopen the wound and stage highly 
confrontational exchanges between victims and perpetrators is open to 
question. But the fact that the most systematic political survey in Taiwan, 
TEDS, does not even have any question on how voters feel about transitional 
justice shows some degree of timidity and conservatism. It will be hard to 
move democracy forward if the nation is stuck in the past, but it is equally . 
hard if the past is simply glossed over. 
On the prospective side, our poll analysis has also identified the 
contours of an emerging agenda of social justice for Taiwan's continued 
democratic reform. Voters want their democracy to do a better job of 
protecting human rights, women's rights, and environment; they also serve 
politicians notice that they are fed up with corruption and money and 
3] 
violence in politics. 
All said, Taiwan's electoral democracy seems secure for now, and the 
society has shoM1 increasing signs that it is also embarking on the road to 
liberal democracy. 
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